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Current IP encryption methods offered by FPGA vendors use an approach where the IP is decrypted during the CAD flow, and remains unencrypted in the bitstream. Given the ease of accessing modern bitstream-to-netlist tools, encrypted IP is vulnerable to inspection and theft from the IP user. While the entire bitstream can be encrypted, this is done by the user, and is not a mechanism to protect confidentiality of 3rd party IP. In this work we present a design methodology, along with a proof-of-concept tool, that demonstrates how IP can remain partially encrypted through the CAD flow and into the bitstream. We show how this approach can support multiple encryption keys from different vendors, and can be deployed using existing CAD tools and FPGA families. Our results document the benefits and costs of using such an approach to provide much greater protection for 3rd party IP. 

Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are widely used for custom hardware implementations, including in many security-sensitive industries, such as defense, communications, transportation, medical, and more. Compiling source hardware descriptions to FPGA bitstreams requires the use of complex computer-aided design (CAD) tools. These tools are typically proprietary and closed-source, and it is not possible to easily determine that the produced bitstream is equivalent to the source design. In this work, we present various FPGA design flows that leverage pre-synthesizing or pre-implementing parts of the design, combined with open-source synthesis tools, bitstream-to-netlist tools, and commercial equivalence-checking tools, to verify that a produced hardware design is equivalent to the designer’s source design. We evaluate these different design flows on several benchmark circuits and demonstrate that they are effective at detecting malicious modifications made to the design during compilation. We compare our proposed design flows with baseline commercial design flows and measure the overheads to area and runtime. 

Abstract: This work presents a novel technique to physically clone a ring oscillator physically unclonable function (RO PDF) onto another distinct FPG A die, using precise, targeted aging. The resulting cloned RO PDF provides a response that is identical to its copied FPGA counterpart, i.e., the FPGA and its clone are indistinguishable from each other. Targeted aging is achieved by: 1) heating the FPGA using bitstream-Iocated short circuits, and 2) enabling/disabling ROs in the same FPGA bitstream. During self heating caused by short-circuits contained in the FPGA bitstream, circuit areas containing oscillating ROs (enabled) degrade more slowly than circuit areas containing non-oscillating ROs (disabled), due to bias temperature instability effects. This targeted aging technique is used to swap the relative frequencies of two ROs that will, in turn, flip the corresponding bit in the PUF response. Two experiments are described. The first experiment uses targeted aging to create an FPGA that exhibits the same PUF response as another FPGA, i.e., a clone of an FPGA PUF onto another FPGA device. The second experiment demonstrates that this aging technique can create an RO PUF with any desired response. 

This work demonstrates a novel method of accelerating FPGA aging by configuring FPGAs to implement thousands of short circuits, resulting in high on-chip currents and temperatures. Patterns of ring oscillators are placed across the chip and are used to characterize the operating frequency of the FPGA fabric. Over the course of several months of running the short circuits on two-thirds of the reconfigurable fabric, with daily characterization of the FPGA 6 performance, we demonstrate a decrease in FPGA frequency of 8.5%. We demonstrate that this aging is induced in a non-uniform manner. The maximum slowdown outside of the shorted regions is 2.1%, or about a fourth of the maximum slowdown that is experienced inside the shorted region. In addition, we demonstrate that the slowdown is linear after the first two weeks of the experiment and is unaffected by a recovery period. Additional experiments involving short circuits are also performed to demonstrate the results of our initial experiments are repeatable. These experiments also use a more fine-grained characterization method that provides further insight into the non-uniformed nature of the aging caused by short circuits.